

TOP SECRET

25X1

24 July 1963

25X1

Copy No. C 21-3

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



25X1

State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100340001-5

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100340001-5

24 July 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Arab States: Syria may form a bilateral union with Iraq. (Page 1)
2. Rumania-USSR: Soviet-Rumanian differences over certain CEMA policies apparently have been resolved. (Page 2)
3. Hungary: The Soviet leadership appears to be interested in seeing the Mindszenty question resolved. (Page 3)
4. Dominican Republic: Bosch's current political difficulties may prompt him to take impulsive action, such as resigning. (Page 4)

25X1

6. Notes: Iran-Iraq--Kurds; Brazil; Brazil - Communist China; Bolivia; South Korea. (Page 6)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 July 1963

DAILY BRIEF

Arab States: The Syrian Baathists have taken Nasir's two-hour speech on 22 July as notification of Egyptian withdrawal from the tripartite unity movement and may now proceed with their own plans for a bilateral union with Iraq.

A Baathist spokesman in Damascus stated yesterday that difficulties between Syria and Egypt did not rule out the possibility of a different union. Such a union has for some time been a subject of reports and speculation inspired by Syrian-Iraqi differences with Nasir and the close cooperation that has existed between the two Baathist regimes. A union of the two would serve as visible proof of the Baathists' avowed devotion to Arab unity and as a rebuttal to Nasir's claim to pre-eminence in the unity movement.

Nasir's speech was almost entirely devoted to castigation of the Syrian Baathist leadership. He appealed for a new pan-Arab organization that would incorporate all Arab nationalist groups, including the Baathists. He repeatedly referred to "good, young, conscientious" Baathists in transparent encouragement to such elements to rebel against their party leaders.

The Egyptian-controlled Middle East News Agency has quickly taken up the need for a new "Arab Revolutionary Socialist Movement," suggesting that Egyptian policy and propaganda may now take this new line in an attempt to counter Baathist influence in the area; Nasir may also step up subversive activity against Damascus. Iraq was virtually ignored in Nasir's speech and no reaction has yet been reported from Baghdad.

25X1

Rumania-USSR: The USSR and Rumania have apparently resolved their differences over certain CEMA policies.

On 20 July, Rumanian Ambassador Guina in Moscow told the US ambassador that Rumania's troubles within the Soviet bloc had been solved in a manner satisfactory to Bucharest. He added that this would be confirmed publicly within a week. Such confirmation could emerge from the meeting of the leaders of CEMA member countries opening in Moscow today.

While no detailed information regarding the substance of the solution is available, the Rumanian ambassador's apparent satisfaction suggests that the USSR has made some concessions to the Rumanian views. Moreover, the USSR on 14 July and East Germany on 17 July reprinted portions of a Rumanian article reaffirming the correctness of Rumania's economic development.

25X1

Hungary: The Soviet leadership appears interested in seeing the question of Hungarian Cardinal Mindszenty's status resolved.

At a 21 July dinner honoring the visiting Hungarian delegation, Khrushchev termed "sensible" Under Secretary of State Harriman's statement to Hungarian leader Kadar that improved US-Hungarian relations depend on a solution of the problem.

Although Hungarian churchmen have been in contact with the Vatican, Kadar indicated that his regime has not been in touch with the new Pope. He said that the cardinal might now be in Rome had not Pope John's death in June interrupted negotiations. This apparently was meant to suggest that the two sides were not far apart.

25X1

Dominican Republic: (President Bosch may yet feel compelled to take some impulsive action to rid himself of his current political difficulties.)

(Bosch is under heavy pressure from anti-Communist extremists in the armed forces who want him to take a stronger stand against the Communists. In addition, the leadership of Bosch's own party in Congress is forcing his hand on the issue of control of the police force. The police are presently under the control of Antonio Imbert, the political opponent most dangerous to Bosch. In a speech on 16 July, Bosch indicated that he would resign rather than bow to undue pressures from the military.)

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] expressed fear about the future following Bosch's speech. [redacted] apparently believes that Bosch is in an unusually disturbed state. However, before his inauguration, Bosch used the threat of resignation to get his way, and lately has appeared to be standing up to his critics.)

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100340001-5

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100340001-5

25X1

NOTES

Iran-Iraq--Kurds: (The Iranian Government may offer to mediate the Iraqi-Kurdish dispute. The Iranian foreign minister says he has received indications that both sides might be ready to consider a cease-fire and negotiation. Tehran maintains lines of communication to the Iraqi Kurds and also appears to have gained some Iraqi good will in recent weeks by tightening controls on Iran's border with Iraq.)

25X1

Brazil: Foreign Minister Evandro Lins has suggested that his government is considering support for Cuba's application for membership in the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). Lins told a Rio de Janeiro newspaper, according to a statement [redacted] that Brazil will study the matter very carefully and that "we cannot close the doors to a nation which is a member of the American community."

25X1

25X1

Brazil - Communist China: President Goulart's reported personal meeting last week with a Chinese Communist trade delegation is not likely to result in any significant increase in the present negligible level of trade between the two countries. Goulart's Communist press secretary entertained the members of the delegation as guests of honor at a 17 July dinner, according to the Brazilian press. The Chinese, who are apparently members of a group that went to Brazil in early June to organize trade expositions in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, may also be exploring the possibility of establishing permanent trade representation, such as Communist China maintains in Chile.

25X1

*Bolivia: Between 160 and 200 additional armed government agents have been sent "to get rid of" the Communist union leadership in the key mining area of Catavi, the center of militant union opposition to the government's mine-reform proposals. This confrontation could be violent; violence also may occur if the miners, who are known to possess arms, carry out their plan to march on the capital for demonstrations on 27 July. The Bolivian armed forces are still on alert and confined to quarters.

25X1

25X1

South Korea: (Pak Chong-hui's military government may use South Korea's grain shortage as an excuse for delaying the change to representative government tentatively scheduled for later this year. Regime officials have been implying that a change of government is likely to be delayed unless the United States immediately supplies an additional 400,000 tons of grain. US officials in Korea, nevertheless, believe that the Koreans have enough grain--including scheduled American deliveries--to meet their minimum needs through October when the new rice crop will be harvested.)

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100340001-5

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100340001-5

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100340001-5

TOP SECRET